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Chhibber empirically assesses inflation in Africa  markets emerged.  Adjusting the official ex-
using various price indicators and examines the  change rate may actually have lowered inflation
major instruments of anti-inflationary policy in  in Ghana by reducing fiscai deficits. High fiscal
Africa.  He sets up a generalized model of  deficits, financed primarily by creating money,
inflation and examines four special cases of that  were the underlying cause of inflation.
model, representing four prototypical African
policy regimes:  * The reason for lower, stable inflation in
countries with pegged exchange rates is the
(I)  Countries with pegged exchange rates,  underlying monetary and financial arrangerments,
an open capital account, and no price controls  not the fixed exchange rate. The open capital
(the  3 countries of the CFA franc zone).  account between countries of the franc zone
(2)  Fixed-but-adjusting exchange rates, with  ensures that the money supply is not a policy
a closed capital account and selective price  variable.  Domestic expansion of credit affects
controls (as in Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Kenya).  the balance of payments but does not lead to
(3)  Fixed-but-adjusting exchange rates with  inflation and money expansion.
widespread parallel markets, a closed capital
account, and selective price controls (as in  * The key to price stability lies in providing
Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia).  checks on large fiscal deficits and noninflation-
(4)  Dual exchange rates and a closed capital  ary mechanisms for financing them.  In prin-
account, but with extensive, effective price  ciple, this can be done through responsible
controls (as in Algeria and Ethiopia).  spending and revenue policies. In practice, it
requires institutional arrangements that restrain
Drawing on results from empirical studies,  profligate spending. An open capital account is
Chhibber focuses especially on the interaction of  one such mechanism (witncss Indonesia).
exchange rate policy and inflation.  He con-  Another is effectively to separate monetary and
cludes, among other things, that:  fiscal policy, either by joining a monctary union
(like the CFA franc zone) or by establishing and
At first glance, there seems to be a strong  managing a central bank with the (fiercely
correlation betwecn exchange-rate regimes and  protected) independence of the U.S. Federal
inflation.  Countries with floating exchange rates  Reserve System and with a status equal to the
(or auction systcms) seem to have experienced  judicial system.
higher inflation and countries with fixed cx-
change rates lower inflation.  But the story is  * The benefit of joining a monetary system is
more complex than that.  price stability - but the costs are high. The best
option is to control fiscal and monetary policy
* In such countries as Ghana, Sierre Leone,  without the rigidity of a fixed, pegged exchange
Uganda, and Zambia, high inflation prevailed  rate. The path that countries such as Indonesia
before exchange reforms, even when the ex-  have followed - through the open capital
change rate was fixed.  High inflation rendered  account - provides price stability without
the official exchange rate irrelevant, and parallel  jeopardizing growth.
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This paper is a part of a larger project on inflation and price decontrol in Africa. It drav s on individual case
studies from this project as well as on a wider literature on this subject.  It does not represent the official views of
the World Bank or any of its affiliated organizations.  I am grateful for extensive discussions and comments on the
paper from Nemat Shafik and Bela Balassa.
I am also grateful for discussions on issues presented in this paper with Joaquin Cottani,  Shanta Devarajan,
Patrick Honohan, Ali Khadr, James Parks, and Michael Walton.1.  Introduction
There is growing  concern  over the acceleration  of inflation  in a large  number  of economies  in Sub-Saharan
Africa. While  few African  countries  have  experienced  the triple-digit  inflation  often  observed  in Latin America',
the average  inflation  rate has increased  markedly,  sometimes  five-fold  in many  countries. The social  and economic
consequences  of this inflation have been harsh,  wore  so because few African  countries have the institutions  to
manage inflation either through indexation  or through safety net programs.  Moreover, with persistently  high
inflation  there is the danger  that inflation  may  become  self-generating  because  of changing  expectations  about future
inflation.2
World  Bank-IMF  programs  have  been  increasingly  identified  as the cause  of accelerating  inflation  in Africa.
A central  element  of these  programs  has  been  the re-alignment  of exchange  rates, combined  with price liberalization
and decontrol  of interest rates. It is alleged  that the introduction  of such programs  has led to cost-push  inflation.
Without  sufficient  supply response (and  export response)  these  price changes  have had little positive  real effects,
while generating  higher inflation. 3 Concern  over  the inflationary  consequences  of reform  have  led several  countries
to delay  and in a few cases to abort reform  programs. The relatively  low inflation  in the Franc Zone  countries  in
Africa  has lent  credence  to these  arguments. It is widely  believed  that the fixed-exchange  rate for the Franc-zone
countries  has been an important  fartor in their low inflation  rates.'
' One  exception  is Uganda  where  a combination  of civil  war, drought  and mismanagement  has led to tripie-digit
inflation  since 1985. Triple digit inflation  has also  occasionally  been observed  in Ghana,  Sierra Leone  and Zaire.
The inflation  rates used in this study refer to recorded  CPI inflation.  In some  cases unrecorded  inflation  has been
much higher. We will discuss  this issue in later sections  of the paper.
2 The heterodox approach to combating  inflation in Latin America  argues that the traditional stabilization
package  is insufficient  to fight inflation. This is because  the systern  needs to bring down expectations  on future
inflation  which  are high. This requires  a heterodox  approach  combining  price controls  with stabilization  policies.
For a survey of these  issues see Kiguel  and Liviatian  (1989), Blejer  and Cheasty (1988) and Bruno  et al (1989).
The most recent  criticism  has come  from the ECA - Economic  Commission  for Africa.
4See for example  Guillaumont  and Guillaumont  (1989) and Honohan  (1990).The CFA zone comprises  13
countries  in Sub-Saharan  Africa.  The common  currency  is the CFA franc  which is valued at one-fiftieth  the value
of the French  Franc. The CFA franc  has therefore  moved  up or down with respect  to other  currencies  in the same
proportion  as the French  tranc.2
This paper provides  an analvtical  and selective  empirical  survey of inflation in Sub-Saharan  Africa.  It
begins in Section  2 with an empirical  assessment  of inflation in Africa using various price indicators. Section  3
looks at the major instruments  of anti-inflationary  policy in Africa.  Instead  of listing each instrument  the paper
attempts to distinguish  countries  by broad policy regimes  into four uategories.
A common  geineralized  model  of inflation  is set-up, and each policy  regime  is shown  to be a special  case
of that  general  model. The four prototypes  we classify  are: a) the CFA franc  zone model  of pegged  exchange  rates,
open capital  account  and no price controls, b) fixed-but-adjusting  exchange  rates, with closed  capital account  and
some  selective  price controls,  examples  a)  e Zimbabwe,  Malawi,  Kenya; c) fixed-but-adjusting  exchange  rates  with
widespread  parallel markets,  closed capital account and selective  price controls, exaaLples  are Ghana, Nigeria,
Tanzania  and Zambia;  and  d) dual exchange  rates, closed  capital accour  , but with extensive  and eftective  price
controls, examples  are Algeria,' Ethiopia.
Section  4 uses the results  from various  empirical  studies' to examine  the issues  of policy  coordination  and
sequencing  that arise under each of these policy regimes. The paper particularly  focuses  on the interaction  of
exchange  rate policy and inflation in view of the recent  debate  on this subject. The question  of unravelling  price
controls  and its implication  for exchange  rate, monetary  and fiscal  policy  and financial  sector reforms  is examnined.
The last section  draws the lessons  from the survey.
'  Algeria  has a substantial  parallel market,  where  according  to an official  survey transactions  comp, se about
20% of total consumption. There  are indications  that the parallel  and legal markets  are fairly segmented  with the
parallel  market  supplied  through  own exchange  imports. Demand  for goods in the legal market  has been  controlled
and has not spilt over into the parallel  market  to the same  extent  as in Ghana,  Tanzania  and Nigeria. One indicator
of this is that  during  the period 1979-89  the parallel  market  exchange  rate  depreciated  by 10.8% per annum  whereas
official  inflation  was 9. 1  % per annum.
'  This includes the country studies conducted  under the World Bank's research  project '  Inflation, Price
Decontrol  and Fiscal Adjustment  in Africa." Draft case studies  are available  for Algeria, Cote d'lvoire, Ghana,
Malawi  and Zimbabwe.3
Figure  1:  Inflation  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa:  1960-1989
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2.  Empirical Trends
Inflation ir. Sub-Saharan Africa coincided with global trends in  1960s.  Since 1975, average inflation in
SSA has remained above inflation in the industrial countries and in Asia by about 10 percentage points per annum
(Table 1 and Figure  1).  While inflation in the industrial countries has averaged 7 percent per annum during 1975-
1988, in SSA the average has been about 16.4 percent per annum.  This average masks considerable disparity.  In
particular inflation has been much lower in countries belonging to the CFA zone (Table I and Figure 2).
Inflation rates in Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and in the eub-set of CFA franc zone countries were abouL
the same until  197^ (Figure 2).  Since then ififlation has been much lower in the CFA fran-  zone countries where
it has followed closely inflation in the industrial countries, and more particularly, inflation in France.  The average
for Sub-Saharan Africa has deviated from industrial country inflation substantially since 1977. The average includes
countries with extensive price controls  and  the CFA  franc-zone countries.  In  some individual cases recorded
inflation has  been much higher 7. Recorded triple digit  inflation has been observed  in at  least four countries -
Ghana, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zaire.
The recorded inflatirn often greatly underestimates true inflation in the system.  This is especially true of
countries with ex.ensive price controls.  In some cases this inflation spills over into parallel  marketr wherss it is
observed but unrecorded, such as in Ghana, Nigeria atnd  Zambia and more recently in Angola.  In other cases the
controls  are effective in keeping inflation in check but lead to unmet demand which  shows up in the  form of
unusually large real money balances.
Data on unremorded inflation in parallel markets are not  widely available, and  certainly not  available
systematically over time to get a meaningful picture.  Data are available on a systematic basis for the exchange rate
prermum.  These are not a fully accurate indicator of unrecorded inflation, because the exchange premium reflects
a  greater  risk on  illegal  exchange transactions.  But it  nevertheless  is a  useful  indicator of  the existence  of
unrecorded inflation in the economy.
' Countries with inflation over 20 percent in the 1980s are for example Ghana, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somnalia,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia.5
Tabie 1: Inflation  in Sub-I'aran  Africa: 1975-89
(Average  Annual)
1980-89  1975-89  Highest Recorded
Industrial  Countries  5.0  6.4
Asia  7.9  7.3
Sub-Saharan Africa  17.2  16.7
More than  20 percent
Ghana  43.7  52.2  122.9
Sierra Leone  63.7  43.9  178.7
Somalia*  41.1  32.9  91.2
Sudan*  33.1  25.1  64.7
Tanzania  30.5  24.1  35.3
Uganda  104.6  --  238.1
Zaire  58.8  62.1  101.0
Zambia*  30.8  24.5  55.6
Between 10-20 rercent
Botswana  10.5  11.0  16.4
Burundi  7.6  10.1  36.6
Gambia  17.9  15.1  56.7
Kenya  10.4  11.3  20.4
Lesotho  13.6  13.9  J8.0
Madagascar*  17.2  14.3  31.8
Malawi  16.6  --  33.9
Mauritius  7.6  10.8  42.0
Nigeria  20.5  18.9  40.9
Swaziland*  13.9  13.7  20.8
Zimbabwe  13.5  12.3  23.1
Under !0 percent
Burkina Faso  4.1  6.4  30.0
Cameroon*  9.4  9.8  17.2
C. Afr.Rep.**  3.9  --  14.6
Congo*  8.0  8.5  17.4
Cote d'lvoire*  5.3  9.5  27.4
Djibouti  4.2  --  18.1
Ethiopia  4.3  8.3  28.5
Gabon*  7.7  9.8  28.4
Liberia*  4.3  6.1  19.5
Niger  2.4  6.7  23.5
Rwanda  4.4  6.8  31.1
Senegal  6.5  6.6  31.7
Togo  4.0  6.3  22.5
*  For these countries averages are for 1980-88 and  1975-88.
**  For these countries averages are for 1981-89.6
Table 2  Classification  of Macro-Policy  Regimes
in Sub-Saharan Africa
TYPE  I - Fixed Exchange Rates; Open Capital Account; Nonu or very few price controls
Benin  Congo  Mali
Burkina  Faso  Cote  d'lvoire  Niger
Cameroon  Equatorial  Guinea  Senegal
Central African  Republic  Gabon  Swaziland
Chad  Lesotho  Togo
Comoros
TYPE 11  - Fixed-but-Adjusting  Exchange  Rates, Closed  Capital  Accounts,  Selective  Price Controls
Burundi  Rwanda
Cape Verdi  Seychelles
Kenya  Zimbabwe
Mauritius
TYPE III - Dual/Multiple  Exchange  Rates;  Closed  Capital  Accounts;  Selective  Price Controls
Gambia  Malawi  Sudan
Ghana  Nigeria  Tanzania
Guinea  Sao  Tome  & Principe  ZaireUganda
Guinea-Bissau  Somalia  Zambia
Madagascar
TYPE IV - Dual/Multiple  Exchange  Rates;  Closed  Capital  Accounts;  Widespread  Price Controls
Algeria'  Ethiopia
Angola  2  Mozambique  2
I  Although  Algeria is not in Sub-Saharan  Africa it is included  here for discussion.
2  It is important  to point  out that countries  such  as Angola  and Mozambique  have  extensive  price  controls  but
are unable to enforce  them.7
3. The General Frameworik
We begin with a general framework for analyzing intlation.  The framework incor,,Nrates  cost-push and
monetarist features, and it builds in the implications of price controls - both selective and general.  We then examnint
the  implications of the four prototype policy regimes we set out in the introduction anu show that these are special
cases of the general framework.'
Overall inflation is a weighted average of  inflation in traded goods prices (pt), non-traded goods  prices
(pn), and controlled-price goods (pc).
p  =  al  pt  + a2 pn  + (1-al-a2)  pc (1)
where al  and a2 are 0  C  I
When tde economy is subject to widespread price controls al  and a2 are close to zero and domestic inflation
reflects governments decisiorn  to change controlled prices.  The wedge between pc the controlled prices and free
prices reflects price distortions in the system.
For traded goods,  the domestic inflation is equal to the change in the foreign price plus the change in the
nominal exchange rate.9
pt  = pf  + e  (2)
e  We have classified African countries into these four prototypes in Tabie 2.
9 This should strictly also include changes in the trade regime.  For the sake of simplification we ign.i;e those
generally discrete changes.8
For non-traded  goods  we use  a standard  mark-up  modei.  '°  The mark-up  is aoplied  to unit labor costs  (wc)
and the cost of imported  inputs (mc).
pn= (I+mu)*( mnc,  wc )  (3)
Instead  of using a rixed rnark-up  (mu) as is commonly  assumed  we make the change in the mnark-up  a
function  of excess  demand  in the system. The excess  demand  i5 not directly  measurable. In economies  in which
financial  instruments  are not well developed  and substitution  between  mcney  and other financial  assets  is small,  a
good proxy for excess  demand is excess  real money balances  defin,A as the excess  real money supply over real
money demand (EMB).  This appears to perform well empirically 'as we report later), and is aaalytically
convenient.
Using a quadratic  cost-function  we  get the following  simplified  mark-up  equation  for infiation  in  non-traded
goods.
pn = bl EMB + b2  riic + b3 wc  (4)
where  b2+b3  < 1, b1 >0
Changes  in import costs are the sum of changes  in foreign  prices and the exchange  rate.
mc = pf + e  (5)
'° Bruno  (1979)  and Gordon  (1975).  Non-traded  goods  refer both to goods that it is not feasible  to trade, such
as land, and goods that are de-facto  non-tradeables  such as those subject  to non-tariff  barriers.9
Combining  (I)-(S) we get the overall  inflation  equation
p=- dl (pf+e)  + d2  wc  + d3 EMB + d4 c  (6)
This general model  adequately  identifies  the basic sources  of inflation  in the African  context. These can
be categorized  as: imported inflation (pf), inflation due to the cost-push  effect of devaluation (e), wage-push
inflation (w~c),  demnand-pull  inflation  (EMB), and inflation arising from the control and subsequent  decontrol  of
prices.
Turning now to the four prototvpe  policy regimes  that were identified  earlier to see how this
general framework  is modified  under each of these.
Type I: Pegged  Exchange Rate: Open  Capital  Account
This is the CFA fra,c zone  model. The  exchange  rate is fixed  at one-fiftieth  the value  of the French  franc.
Tre exchange  rate i%  therefore.  fixed  only in relation  to the french franc  but obviously  varies  with respect  to other
currencies. 'Mere are no  significant  price controls. Each  individual  country  has no effective  control  on monetary
policy.  Economic  policy in the CFA zone is managed  in two sub-zones,  each with a central  bank - the BCEAO
and the BEAC. The money supply  is not an effective  prAicy  variable  because  of the open capital  account.'"
In this policy  framework  the underlying  or base  inflation  is equal  to the French  inflation  rate. Temporary
deviations  around  this base inflation  rate can come from several factors  such as droughts, wage-push,  or because
of differences  in pass-through  of imported  inflation  to non-traded  goods prices.  But over the long run, inflation
converges  to the French  inflation  rate.
" For a mnore  detailed  description  of the monetary  arguments  in the CFA Zone, see Bhatia  (1985) and Honohan
(1990 b).l0
This  is contirimed in a  recent  study  t  intlation  in CFA  franc zone countries  by  Honohan  (1990a).
Ilonohani shows that  in thti long-run there is a teid  ncy tor  intlation  in CFA  zone countries to converge to  the
French intlation rate.  Porohan  also lo()ks at the eftect of domestic credit policy on money supply in four CFA
franc zone countries.  lie confirms that in three of the tour covntries domestic credit policy has no lasting efcect
on moncy supply.  This i'. to he expected given the open capital account in these countries and the statutory freedom
ot capital movements between France and the CFA franc zone members.
Membtrship i- the CFA franc zone theretore ensures low inflation as there is very little imported cost-push
intlation and checks on monetary po)l:cy  are pro .ided by membership in the monetary union.  At the sane  time the
costs in terms of growth have beln  very higii.  Devarajan and de Melo (1990) document the dismal performance
of CFA Zone countries in the 1980s.
Type II: Fixed-but-Adjusting  Exchange  Rates, Closed  Capital  Account,  Selective  Price Controls
This po)licy regime is typically tound in economies such as Kenya and Zimbabwe' 2. The exchange rate
is fixe l but subject to discrete uvvaluations.  T'he exchange rate is therefore temporarily misaligned when exchange
rate adjustments are delaved.  'hese  show up in balance of payments problems which are resolved through import
controls and foreign exchanige  rationing.  Htowever,  the misalignment is never large enough for the system to spill-
over into large parallel markets.  The capital account is closed;  as a  -esult government expenditure and  credit
po)licies  affect the money supply.  There are sei-tive  pnce controls, applied to particular commodities to protect
the ;sx>r and the urban working class.  But the conitrols are not widespread.
In this system the diagnosis of inflation is complex.  It can come from any of  the four sources in our
general model. T'here i.s  the cost-push inflation fronm  discrete devaluations.  Demand-pull inflation is prevalent when
there is excess demand in the system created by excessive credit expansion in the economy, typically to finance
unsustainable budget deficits.  Note that while we classify the devaluation generated inflation as cost-push, the
reasons for it are otten excess demand in the system which spills over into balance of payments problems requiring
For a go(wd  description and analvsis of Kenva's Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy, see Killick and Mwega
(1989).  For Zimbabwe, see Chh,hber et. al (1988).11
corfective devaluation.  This inflation is temporarily suppressed by import controls,  but is then released by the
devaluation.
Selective price controls also keep inflation in check temporarily.  When price controls are applied directly
to  private traders they  are generally not enforceable.  If they are enforced they  typically reduce private  profit
margins and discourage future investment.  Price controls are better enforced when applied to products produced
or distributed by a state enterprise, e.g.  utilities, transport agencies and public food distribution agencies.  The cost
of these controls are higher deficits of these state agencies which must then be financed by transfers from the state
budget.  The financing of these higher budgets creates inflationary pressures. When controlled prices deviate widely
from market prices their  re-adjustment creates inflation.
A recent detailed analysis of  inflation in Zimbabwe by Chhibber et al (1989) brings out some of these
elements.  The Zimbabwe study also reveals the  presence of wage-push  inflation brought about  by a  surge in
nominal wages legislated by the govemment after  independence in 1981 (see Table 3).  As these wage increases
were not based on underlying growth in labor productivity they could not be sustained.  The resulting inflation
wiped out the  nominal wage increases,  and restored  real wages to their  trend levels.  This type of  wage-push
inflation is rare in Africa.  Organized labor unions are not very strong, except in a few cases.  The typical pattern
has been one of continuous decline in real wages, coinciding with the decline in per capita GDP.  Nevertheless, it
shows that nominal wage increases not based on underlying labor productivity  improvenments  will be wiped  out
quickly through higher inflation.
The inflation equacdons  from the Zimbabwe study are shown in Table 3.  These confirm that the diagnosis
of inflation in Type 11  economies is complex.  Separate equations are also presented for the high income and low
income consumers.  These show that the causes of  inflationary pressures in the two cases vary.  As one would
expect, in the case of high income consumers the effect of selective price controls is non-existent, whereas in the
case of low income consumers changes in selective price controls matter a great deal.
The pass-through effect of cost-push inflation from a devaluation is small (coefficient of 0.14),  considering
that the import/GDP  ratio is over 25 percent of GDP.  This low pass-through may be unique to Zimbabwe because
of its relatively well developed industrial sector and a capital goods sector which allows for greater substitutionTable  3a:  Zimbabwe Inflation  Equations;  TSLS
Equation  Constant  *Pf  tp  1og(U/P_1 )  log  y  i  Cf  Cs  R
2 D.W_
VII 1.1.  Ovor-rl  l
Inflation  0.8312  0.1402  0.3463  0.0818  -0.1482  0.83  0.79  1.99
(6)  (1.55)  (2.42)  (2.68)  (1.94)  (2.21)  (3.42)
111.1.2.  ¢  0.4034  0.0995  0.2760  0.1181  -0.1430  0.69  -0.6073  0.89  1.89
(1.34)  (2.28)  (2.74)  (3.82)  (2.98)  (3.12)  (3.40)
111.1.3.  ¢  0.7159  0.0828  0.3119  0.1058  -0.1764  0.98  -0.28S1  0.87  2.44
(2.23)  (1.88)  (2.92)  (3.10)  (3.32)  (4.92)  (2.83)
11I.1.4.  0.6150  0.0761  0.2738  0.1213  -0.1819  0.73  -0.3713  -0.1584  0.91  2.48
(1.83)  (1.83)  (3.01)  (4.16)  (3.82)  (3.88)  (2.38)  (1.78)
All Equations  were estimates  with  two stage  least  square,  using  TSP.  The  instruments  used were  change  in  import  prices,  lagged  nconnal
interest  rates,  lagged  real  money  balances,  lagged  money  growth,  lagged  inflation,  lagged  log  GDP, fiscal  deficit  as  a  share  of  C8P,  Cf  ,
C,  and  the  lagged  difference  between  real  wages and  productivity  growth.
e  *  F  = Change  in  import  prices  in  Zimbabwe  S
11/P_ 1 =12  deflated  by  lagged  CPI
y  =  real  CDP
i  =  8-month  deposit  interest  rate
Cf  = difference  tetween  food  inflatior,  for low  income  versus  high  income
Cs  =difference  between  service  inflation  for  low  income  versus  high  inflation
4p  =  change  in  unit  labor  costTable 3b: Zimbabwe Inflation: Low and High Incomes
(1969-86)
Equation  Constant  *4 f  log(U/P. 1)  log  y  i  Cf  Cs  R2  D.W.
111.2.1.  Low income  0.411B  0.0929  0.1473  1  0.1489  -0.18e9d  0.83  -0.8505  -0.3443  0.69  2.83
PL  (1.09)  (1.68)  (1.:1)  (3.75)  (2.82)  (3.28)  (3.11)  (2.85)
TI1.2.2.  PL  0.2344  0.0788  0.1885  -0.1822  0.85  -0.8989  -0.3458  0.88  2.E8
(o.e8)  (1.40)  (4.48)  (2.88)  (3.28)  (3.33)  (2.80)
III.2.3.  High,Income  0.8135  0.0593  0.3912  0.09e4  -0.1541  0.84  -0.0982  -0.0214  0.E9  2.19
pH  (2.15)  (1.40)  (4.25)  (3.25)  (3.39)  (3.33)  (0.81)  (0.23)  w
J11.2.4.  PH  0.8835  0.  024  0.4019  0.0918  -0.171  0.70  0.90  2.23
(2.63)  (1.74)  (4.79)  (3.15)  (3.82)  (4.85)
All  Equations  were estimates  with two stage  least square,  using TSP.  The instrurnents  used were  change  in import prices,  nominal  interest rates,
lagged  real money  balances,  lagged money  growth,  lagged  inflation,  lagged  log CDP,  fiscal deficit  as  a  share  of CDP, Cf, Cs and the difforenco
between wages  and productivity  growth.
e pf  Change  in import  prices  in Zimbabwe 3
U/P. 1 U2 deflated  by lagged  CPI
y  real  CDP
;  =  8-month  deposit interest  rate
Cf  difference  between  food inflation  for low income  versus  high income
C,  difference  between  service inflation  for low income  versus  high inflat'on
p  =  change  in unit  labor cost14
possibilities when import prices rise.  The effect is reduced further when price control variables are introduced.
This indicates that the government cushions the effects on the poor of imported inflation for consumer goods also.
The study of  Killick and  Mwega (1989) also shows similar results with  significant effects on Kenyan
inflation  from monetary growth and  import price change and negative effects due to output growth.  The pass-
through effect of import prices is about 0.20,  again sornewhat lower than the share of imports in GDP which is
around 25 percent  of GDP.  Because inflation has been typically  low, lagged inflationary expectations are not
important.  In both the Kenya and Zimbabwe studies, the lagged inflation term was insignificant.
Type m:  Dual/Multiple  Exchange  Rates,  Closed Capital
Account, Selective  Price Controls
Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia are typical examples of this policy regime.  The exchange rate is
fixed but is adjusted through discrete devaluations.  However, in the past severe misalignment of the exchange rate
has led to the emergence of a large parallel market for foreign exchange.  The capital account is closed, but there
is illegal movement of  assets through the parallel mnarket. There are  selective price controls,  but these are not
enforceable because of parallel markets in goods and services.
Excess demand spills over into higher inflation as well as into the parallel market.  It therefore affects the
exchange rate premium.  The official exchange rate affects the parallel market exchange rate in two ways.  On the
supply side, an overvalued exchange rate induces exporters to sell in the parallel market and increases the supply
of foreign exchange in that market.  On the demand side a more overvalued official exchange rate increases the
demnand  for imports.  As this demand cannot be met in the official market it spills over into the parallel market
where it leads to a higher parallel exchange rate and widening exchange premia.
Interest rate policy also matters as it affects the portfolio choice between holding domrstic currency and
foreign assets.  The only channel to acquire foreign assets is through the parallel mnarket  for foreign exchange.
Widening interest  rate differentials  increase the preference for foreign assets.  Tnis leads to a higher demnand  for
foreign exchange in the parallel mnarket  and widening exchange premia.15
This model  of the exchange  premium  was applied  to Ghana  by Chhibber  and Shafik  (1990).'3 The regults
presented  in Table 4 confirm the validity  of the model. Both the official  real exchange  rate and the interest rato
differential  play a significant  role in explaining  exchange  rate prenlia.
As the size of the parallel mnarkets  grows the cost of foreign  exchange  increasingly  reflects the parallel
exchange  rate.  In terms of our general model  the exchange  rate (e) becomes  a weighted average  of the official
exchange  rate (eo) and the parallel  exchange  rate (ep). The inflation  equation  becomes:
=  (wc, EMB, ew.pf,  pc)  (7)
ew =  s.eo +  (1-s)e.
where 0 < s < 1, is the share of foreign  exchange  transactions  in the official  account.
In the extreme, the official exchange  rate has littie relevance in the market.  It simply becomnes  an
accounting  price in government  transactions  with  its own agencies,  in debt service  calculations  and in customs  duty
calculations. Domestic  prices increasingly  reflect  the shadow  cost  of foreign  exchange;  which  is the parallel  market
exchange  rate; s=0.  Grid tests conducted  with  Ghanaian  data and teported  in Chhibber  and Shafik  (1990)  confirm
that 'his was the case in Ghana. The final equations  from that study are also reported  in Table 4.
The results  show that the cost-push  effects of exchange  rates  are higher  in the case  of Ghana  than was the
case in Zimbabwe. The first round effect is 0.16, and the long run effect is larger 0.40,  because  of lagged
inflationary  expectations. 1 4 This is approximately  twice the ;hare of imports/GDP  in the economy. This high
pass-through  is more  typical  of African  economies  where  possibilities  for substitution  between  imported  inputs  and
domestic  goods is limited. Demand  pull variables  are also  significant  in the Ghanaian  case. There  is no wage  push
'3 It follows  the work  of Dombusch  et al (1983) for Brazil  and Rocha  (1989) for Algeria. See also Azam  and
Besley  (1989) for a model  with a somewhat  different  focus.
''  The coefficient  on lagged  inflation  is 0.5872, so the long-run  effect of exchange  rate changes  on inflation  is
0.1649/(1-0.5872)=0.3995. A study  of Tanzania  by Horton  and Mclaren (1989)  finds  very similar  results. Using
a macroeconometric  model of the economy, it shows that a 50 percent devaluation  would lead to a 26 percent
increase  in nominal prices after two years, thereby  eroding  about half of the real impact  of the devaluation.Table  4:  GHANA  EXCHANOE  RATE  PREHIUM  EAUATIONS,  1965-88
Equ-tion  Constant  r  Ry  h2P  DUH 78  PVAR  CHI
2
Dl
1  -0-5157  -0.00Do  0.9992  O.Ou-O  2.87  2.38
(0.74)  (0.17)  (2.56)  (0.63)
2  -0o0303  -o  00;z  1.1486  -18 476  8.54  2.33
(0.20)  (0.85)  (4.00)  (4.01)
3  -0.4874  -0.0038  1.3173  -2.4904  1.8525  13.96  1-73
(2.81)  (2-8?)  (5.67)  (6.21)  (3  56)
All equations were estimated by two stage least squares using PCGIVE.  The Instruments  used  were  lagged  values  of the  exchange  rate differential.
the real .xchange rate, relative yields,  price Variabilt  Inflatlon, and forelgn exchange  as a  proportion of Lports.
r  I  Real  Exchange  Rate  Index  (SICedis)
Ry  Relative Yield between Cedis  and UKStg.
DUH78  a  Dumy  Variable  for  1978
PVAR  Index of Monthly Varlation  in Prices
n2P  a  H2/CPI
CHANA  INFLATION  EnUATIONS,  1965-88
Equation  Constant  e  * P  e  a  f  Log  (H/P-lb  Log  Y  1  PI  CHO
2
D.1W
t  14.3193  0.2909  0.4036  -1.5513  0.0390  0.3209  22.62  1.80
(2.07)  12.C3)  (3.80)  (2.30)  (2.97)  (2.17)
2  8.3233  0.1649  0.3566  -1'0049  0.0258  0.5872  69.60  1.39
(1.97)  (4.52)  (6.90)  (2.32)  (3.25)  (5.22)
3  9.1805  0.0691  0.1474  0.3832  -1.0533  0.0281  0.5596  42  .74  1.35
(1.80)  (0.39)  (1.60)  (5.31)  (2.121  (2.86)  (1.32)
All  equationa  were  estimated  by two  staqe  least  Equares  using  PCCIVE.  The  instruments  used  were  lagged  values
of inflation,  output,  money  supply,  interest  rates,  Import  prices  at  the official  parallel  market  exchange  rates.
and  the  parallel  market  premium.
eO  OfficLal  Exchange  Rats  (Cedia/US$)
ep  Parallel  Harket  Exchange  Rate  (Cedi*/USSI
Pf  a  Foreign  Price  Index  in USS
H  a  Honey  Supply  (H2)
y  I  Real  CDP
I  I  Six-month  Deposit  Rats
PI  :  Laggsd  Inflation17
effect and little impact  from controlled  price  changes  as one would  expect  in an economy  with widespread  parallel
markets.
Type IV: Dual/Multiple Exchange Rate: Closed Capital Account, Widespread Price Controls
The last prototype we examine is the economy subject to widespread  controls.  The exchange  rate is
typically  fixed. Th' capital account  is closed. There are demand  pressures  in the system  arising from high fiscal
deficits. But these  do not translate  into inflation  because  of price controls. There  are widespread  shortages  in the
system  so that the 'true'  inflation  is much higher  than observed  inflation. There  may be a parallel  market  but this
market  remains  small  because  the system  is able to enforce  price controls. There is very little private  ownership
and most  assets, including  fixed  assets  are owned  by the government  or state  agencies. The private  sector is allowed
to hold domestic  foreign assets.
The system  leads  typically  to institutionalized  accumulation  of financial  assets. Real money  holdings  rise
since  incomes  cannot  be translated  into consumption  leading  to forced  savings. This pattern  has been observed  in
a large number  of socialist  countries.
Very few African economies  fall in this category as enforcing this system requires an effective and
institutionalized government machinery.  Two African economies come close to this type of economy - Algeria and
possibly Ethiopia.'"  One indication that price controls are effective in Algeria is that the general model spelled
out in Equation 6  was estimated in a recent study by  Khadr and  Parks (1990) for Algeria and gave very poor
results.  There was no significant effect of changes in imported inflation (and exchange rates) and excess demand
on domestic inflation.  This indicates that domestic inflation is primarily a function of changes in price controls.
In our general model overall inflation is simply equal to the average change in controlled prices:
p = pc  (8)
''  For an earlier discussion and analysis on Algeria see Conway and Gelb (1988).  For a more recent analysis
see Khadr and Parks (1990).18
In this type of economy,  inflation is low but cannot be contained  indefinitely  once the contraJiczions  in
the system  accumulate  and become  unsustuinable.  There is a large  accumulation  of mnonetury  assets  or monetary
overhang  conceptrally  measured  by
(M/p) - (M/pu)  (9)
where,  pu is the true price level and p is the observed  price level.
The monetary  overhang  is a major  problem  when a reform  of the system  .s contemplated. This is because
the decumulation  of these monetary  assets creates a sudden surge in inflation and threatens  the reform.  The
challenge is to manage  this reform such that the decumulation  is staggered  over a period of time.  One way to
manage  the decumulation  of monetary  assets  is to provide  consumers  reaJ  assets  such as land  or houses  which  private
individuals  could not own.  This can help in soaking  up a part of the monetary  overhang.
How large is the monetary  overhang  is not easily  determined  since  pu, the true price level is unknown.
One way to deternine the true price level is to write a well-known  behavioral  function  in terms of the true price
level and transform  these into equations  which could be estimated  for the observed  price level.  For example, a
money  demand  function  using the true price level would  be written  as:
log (Md/pu)  =  ao  +  al  i  + a2fe  +  a3 log (y).
al  > 0, a2 < 0, a3 > 0
al  is >  0 for quasi money,  but < 0 for Ml.
In addition, we can posit a relationship  between  true and observed  prices, which leads to a transformed
equation  which can be estimated." 6
16 Transformed  money demand  functions have been estimated  for China by Feltenstein  and Ha (1989) and
Feltenstein  and Farhadian  (1987). Error corrected  transformed  money  demand  functions  have  also been estimated
for Algeria by  Khadr and Parks (1990).  The need to use an error corrected model indicates that there is
considerable  short-run  disequilibrium  in the money  market  i.e. money  markets  do not clear.19
The question  of how to mange the unravelling  of controls  is currently  a major issue in Algeria. Since p
the 'tmo'  price level is unobserveable,  the question  then arise  as to how to mesure the extent of the moretary
overhang.  One way to do this is to measure  the chan,p in the ratio of real money supply to real GDP.1 7 In
addition  one could neasure the change in the ral  money supply to individual  components  of rea  GDP such as
consumption. However,  the existenc of a paralle markt  implies  that the measre of monetary  supply to official
GDP may  be misleading. Khadr and Parks (1990) corret  this by adding  estimates  of the parallel market  output
to official  GDP and conclude that the emorgence  of parallel markets  help reduce demand pressure, but excess
demand till exists in the system. This unmet  demand  is held in the form of narrow money.
The exchange  rate premium  betwoen  the parallel  market  and the official maket can be analyzed  with a
model  similar  to the one used in Type III.  Rocha  (1989) has  scessfully  estimated  such a model  for Algeria. It
shows  that the relevant explanatory  variables  are the interest  differentials  betwoen Algeria and France, the real
excbango  rate and real money  balances. Excess  demand  in consumer  goods, and to some extent  even in investment
goods spills over into the parallel market  bidding  up the paallel market  exchange  rate.
4. hnplications for Anti-Inflationary Policy
It is clear from our suvey that inflation  was low only in Type I or Type IV countries although  for very
different  reasons. Thse are two  extreme  cases. In the first case  we have  an open capital  ac-count,  a fixed  exchange
rate  and no independent  monetary  policy. This is the policy  regime  in the CFA franc  zone. In the second  case  we
have complete  price controls. But it is clear that this is usually  unsustainable  and the unravelling  of price controls
generally involves wrenching  economic  and often political change because  of a release of repressed  inflation,
moreover,  'truw or virtual inflation  is much  higher than  recorded  inflation  reflecting  unmet  demand. What  do the
1'  Using these ratios Khadr  and Parks (1990) show that the M2/GDP ratio is much higher than in Tunisia,
Morocco,  Turkey,  and Pakistan. It is also higher than the M2/GDP ratios in Sub-Sahaan Africa.20
studies  in Section  3 tell us about how various policies  affect  inflation? We look at three pclicy a  ms in Section  4
and draw the overall  conclusions  in the last section.
4.1 Exchange Rate Policy
The low inflation  rate in the CFA zone  has often led to the conclusion  that exchange  rate devaluation  is
inflationary. In a recent  paper  Guillaumont  and Guillaumont  (1989)  argue that there  are two approaches  to affecting
a change  in the real exchange  rate; through  a nominal  devaluation  or through  a real deflation  in the economy. They
argue that the latter approach  is preferable  because  it avoids  the costs of high inflation. A somewhat  different  but
related critique  has come from the Economic  Commission  for Africa ECA (1989) which argues that a nominal
devaluation  is very quickly  wiped out by inflation  with no effect on the real exchange  rate.  This arises from the
low supply response  and the high share  of monetary  financing  of the budget  in many African  countries. Ub9  d:
the evidence  from the empirical  studies  tell us?
First, there is no doubt that  there is a direct  cost-push  effect  from  exchange  rates  to domestic  prices. This
is confirmed  by the studies  on Ghana  and Zimbabwe  as part of this study;  as well as by a host of studies  in Africa
and other parts of the world."  In general the pass-through  effect of exchange  rate changes  on inflation is likely
to be larger than the share of imports  in GDP.  This is due to the importance  of key imports in the production
process  and the inability  of domestic  industry  to substitute  for these  imports. The Ghana  study  confirms  this result
with a pass-through  effect of 0.40 in an economy  where the share of imports in GDP is about 0.20 on average
during the estimation  period.
The first round pass-through  effect  of exchange  rate changes  on domestic  prices is lower when there is a
substantial  domestic capacity  to produce goods which can substitute for imports.  It is also lower when the
government  does not allow the full pass-through  with price controls  and subsidies. This is the case in Zimbabwe
'' See Chhibber  and Shafik  (1990)  and Chhibber  et al (1989) as well as Tegene  (1989), Horton and McLaren
(1989) and Killick  and Mwega  (1990) for Africa. For empirical  studies  not specific  to Africa, see Bhalla  (1981),
Darrat (1986), Giytsos  (1977) and Saini  (1982).21
where both factors  lead to  a very small  first round  effect of exchange  rate changes  on domestic  inflation. In the
extreme  case where there are complete  price controls  as in Algeria  there is no effect of exchange  rate changes  on
domestic  prices.
The concerns  reflected  in the ECA report on the effects  of devaluation  on inflation  are examined  with a
simulation  exercise  on the Zimbabwe  model  reported  in Table  5. The effects  of exchange  rate changes  on domestic
inflation  ar  examined  under alternate  assumptions  about export response  and the share  of monetary  financing  of
the budget. The simulations  show that in Zimbabwe  under normal  circumstances  about a third of the devaluation
would  get wiped  out by inflation  ( Case 1). Note that  the full effect  of a devaluation  on inflation  is larger than the
first-round  effect  because  the budget  deficit  increases  with a devaluation. The higher budget  deficit  leads throulgh
monetary  financing  to higher inflation. How much  inflation  depends  on the share  of the budget  deficit  financed  by
money  creation. In the case  of Zimbabwe  the net effect of a 109 increase  in the rate of devaluation  is an increase
in inflation  by 3.33 %.22
Table  5'
Devaluation.  Inflation  and  Real Exchane.e  Rate (RER)
Under Alternative  Assumptions
Cumulative  Devaluation  of 21.5%
at the rate of 5% yer arngm
Simulation  Inflation  RER Deprocion
SI:  Rcal Exports to RER  9%  18.5%
s-run Elasticity  0.3
1-run Elasticity  1.0
SII:  Real Exports to RER  10%  17.5%
s-run Elasticity  0.1
1-run Elasticity  1.0
SIII:  Real Exports to RER  16%  11.5%
s-run Elasticity  0.1  -
1-run Elasticity  1.0
50% of budget deficit financed  by
borrowing from Central Bank
(instead  of about 25% in 'i)  and (ii))
SIV:  Real Exports to RER  27.5%  0%
s-run Elasticity  0.1
1-run Elasticity  1.0
50% of budget deficit financed  by
borrowing  from  Central  Bank
(instead  of  about  25%  in  (i)  and  (ii))
Slower  revenue  adjustment  to  inflation23
In the extreme  when the supply  response  of exports is low in the short-run  (elasticity  0. 1), and 50  % of the
budget is finawid by mnoetary  creation  (Case IV) the devaluation ets wiped  out completely. There is no effect
on the real exchange  rate. A 10 % incre  ein the rte  of devaluation  would  lead to a 10% increase  in the inflation
rao.  The  high share of monetary  financing  of the budget deficit is quite common  in Africa. The domestic  bond
markets  are not adequately  developed  for the government  to borrow  in the domestic  market. Therefore, the ECA
critique  needs to be taken seriously. The Ghana  case shows  that this concern  applies only to countries  where the
devaluation leads to a larger fiscal deficit.  Horton and Mclaren (1989) show that this is a serious issue in
Tanuaria."
In Ghana the devaluation  led to an improvement  in the fiscal deficit, and as a result a declining  rate of
inflation.  Both the theory as well as simulations  with the Ghana model  reported  in Chhibber  and Shafik (1990)
show that a slower official  devaluation  would  have neant a higher rate of inflation as well as a nore depreciated
parallel  exchange  rate.  The fiscal  deficit improved,  as mentioned  earlier, because  devaluation  resulted  in higher
donestic currency  equivalent  in foreign aid and a reduction  in exchange  subsidies  to importers. The key role of
foreign  aid in the funding  of Ghana's exchange  reforms came through  its imnpat  in improving  the fiscal position
of the government.
The Ghana  case also shows  that once th-,  mnisalignment  of the exchange  rate had gone very far and there
was a very wide differential  between  the official  and parallel exchange  rate there was very little choice but to
devalue. Consumer  and producer  prices  already  reflected  the parallel  mnarket  exchange  rate. The official  devaluation
was  just the formalization  of the status quo. This was confirmed  by careful  econometric  tests in the Ghana study.
The devaluation  of the official  exchange  rate therefore  had no direct cost-push  effect. This is true also of a large
number of countries  in the Type III category  in Africa  where the extent of misalignment  is so large that reforms
without devaluation  are unlikely  to be successful. Large parallel  markets  are prevalent. In these cases managed
official devaluation  leads  to lower inflation if, and only if, the budget  improves  with the official devaluation.
1"  Th  Horton and McLaren  (1989) study does not adequately  address  the issue of the parallel  exchange  rate.
For a theoretical  discussion  and empirical  determination  of the parllel exchange  rate in Tanzania,  see Kaufmann
and O'Connell (1990).24
One important  conclusion  that can be drawn from these studies is that there is no unique relationshirp
between  devaluation  and inflation. In the first round  there is always  a positive  cost-push  effect  of a devaluation  on
inflation. This is  onfirmed  by almost  all studies  of inflation  in Africa. The exceptions  are countries  with  complete
price controls, but here we see a  build-up of repressed  inflation.  But the subsequent  and overall effect of
devaluation  on inflation  depends  on the impact  of the devaluation  on the budget,  the adequacy  of external funding
of the progrm  and the export response. Carefully  managed  exchange  reforms  therefore  remain  the only vehicle
to correct  exchange  rate misalignment.  The ECA  concern  that  the impact  of nominal  devaluation  or real  devaluation
can be small  is a realistic  possibility;  only if supporting  fiscal  policies  are not in place.
4.2  Monetary and Fiscal  Policy
There is no denying the link between  money  supply and inflation. In the Ghana  and Zimbabwe  studies
the results  from our general model  showed  that excess  real money  balances  had a significant  and positive  effect  on
inflation. This link is confirmed  by a number  of other studies  on inflation  in Africa.'
lIn these  cases  the reduction  in the fiscal  deficit in order to reduce  inflation  is obviously  necessary. In other
cases the solutions  are not so obvious  and require  mnore  fundamental  institutional  reform. In Ghana, for example,
the growth in money  supply in recent  years is due to increasing  net foreign  asseti  This indicates  that mouetary
policy  is ineffective  in sterilizing  the ir.flow  of foreign  assets  (foreign  exchange). One reason  is the negative  denosit
rates,  but anecdotal  evidence  indicates  that  commercial  banks  are unwilling  to accept  deposits  even at these  negative
real interest rates because  the recovery  of the high costs of financial  intermediation  can only be achieved  at real
lending  rates at which the demand  for funds is low.  TLe banking  system  is not willing therefore  to accept  time
deposits  and the currency/deposit  ratio has risen. This money  chases  scarce  goods leading  to higher  inflation. This
indicates fundamental  problems  in the financial  system  leading to high costs of financial  intermediation. This
problem  cannot be resolved  without fundamental  financial  sector  reform.
I  See again for example,  Greene  (1989), Tegene  (1989), London  (1989).25
The reduction  in the fiscal  deficit must also be looked into carefully. How and where the cuts are rnade
matters  a great deal in reducing  inflation? TMis  is because  if cuts in government  expenditure  reduce growth, then
it is not obvious that inflation will be reduced. In the Ghana study, a cut in public investment  leads to lower
monetary  growth  but has no significant  effect  on inflation. This is because  lower public  mvestmnent  leads  to lower
real growth.  The same  trade-offs  emerge in the study on Zimbabwe.
The strong  link between  monetary  growth  and inflation  raises  the issue  of what causes  low inflation  in the
CFA Franc zone countries. The answer  is clearly the CFA franc zone's common  monetary  policy and the open
capital  account. Honohan's  study  of inflation  in the CFA franc  zone  showed  that in three  of the four countries  there
is no link between  domestic  credit growth  and monetary  growth. Excessive  domestic  cr dit growth spills over  into
balance  of payments  problems  rather than into high inflation. Inflation  is low because  monetary  growth is low.
This raises  the issue  of whetlier  the institutional  arrangements  of the CFA franc  zone  can be emulated  in other  parts;
and what are the benefits  and costs of doing so?
The benefit  of membership  in the monetary  union is obviously  lower inflation. However, this has very
little to do with the fixed  nominal exchange  rate.  It arises primarily  from the common  monetary  policy  and the
open capital account.  Along  with the benefits  come  some costs.  In this context Devarajan  and de Melo (1987,
1990)  have  argued  that the cost of a fixed  exchange  rate has been  high variability  in the real  exchange  rate in these
countries  and lower growth  rate.
4.3 Remnoving  Price Controls
In examnining  the question  of price  decontrol  on inflation,  one has  to look  at three  cases: a) economies  with
extensive  price controls, b) economies  with selective-but-enforced  price controls and c) econornies  with parallel
markets.
In Case  a) the issue is one of measuring  the extent  of monetary  over-hang  and determining  how much  can
be absorbed  by special  schemes. These  could involve  the sale of public  assets  such as housing. Alternatively,  the
government  could sell bonds  which  provide  a positive  real return to soak up money  which would  otherwise  chase26
scarce  commnodities.  The remaining  money supply will probably lead to higher domand  for goods and services
driving up inflation.  The pace of the reform  will obviously  determine  how quickly the monetry overhang  gts
dissipated.
A futer reform entails  quicker removal  of price controls  and consequently  higher inflation. Tho degreo
of supply  response  will also determine  the extent  of inflation. In Ghana,  for example,  higher growth has led to an
increase  in the real money balances  lowering  the inflationary  impacw  from the sane level of monetization.
In Case b) the enforcement  of selective  controls implied that demand for commodities  subject to price
controls  could not be met. Typically,  price controls  are effective  wben they au applied through public  enterprise
pricing. But when  applied  directly  to the private  sector  they can be easily  circumvented.  In Zimbabwe  low incom.3
consumers  are protected  by subsidized  transport,  electricity  and publicly  provided  housing.  Part of this demand
spilled over into uncontrolled  commodities  whose prices rose, the unspent  balance  accumulated  as in Case a) into
monetawy  assets.  In this situation,  the price-decontrol  typically  leads to a return of high inflation in the sectors
subject  to price controls;  which  can then conceivably  spill over into cost-push  inflation in other sectors.
In Case c) with  parallel  markets,  there is strictly  speaking  no excess  demand. The dernand  for controlled
commodities  has shifted into parallel markets leading to higher prices there.  Inflation is unrecorded  and price
decontrol  typically  has insignificant  inflationary  effects.27
S. Conclusion
High and rising inflation has emerged  along with other problems  as important issues confronting  Sub-
Saharan Africa.  While  inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa is low in comparison with LAtin  America, it is a serious
problem.  Inflation  rates have increased sharply and most African economies do not have the institutions to manage
high inflation.
At first glance, the evidence appears to suggest a strong correlation between the exchange rate regimes and
inflation.  Countries with floating exchange rates (or auction systems) appear to have experienced higher inflation.
On the other hand, countries  with fixed exchange  rates have typically  faced  lower inflation.
A careful  analysis,  however,  indicates  that  the story  is rmore  complex. In countries  such  as Ghana,  Uganda,
Sierra Leone  and Zambia,  the high  inflation  was prevalent  prior to the exchange  reforms  and was prevalent  through
periods when the exchange  rate was fixed.  The high inflation rendered  the official exchange  rate more or less
irrelevant and parallel markets  emerged.  The level of the official exchange  rate was important for accounting
purposes  but was irrelevant in affecting  behavior  which was driven by the true price of foieign exchange  -- the
parallel  exchange rate.  Detailed analysis of  the  Ghanaian exchange reforms shows  that adjusting  the official
exchange rate may have actually lowered inflation by reducing fiscal deficits.  The underlying cause of inflation was
the high fiscal  deficits, which were financed  primarily  through  monetary  creation.
The lower  and stable  inflation  in countries  with  pegged  exchange  rates such  as those  of the Franc Zone  also
has its genesis  in the underlying  monetary  and financial  arrangements,  rather  than in the fixed  exchange  rate. The
openness  of the capital  account  between  countries  of the zone  ensures  that  the money  supply is not a policy  variable.
Domestic  credit expansion  does not lead to monetary  expansion  and inflation, but instead  affects the balance  of
payments.
The key then to price stability lies in providing checks on  large fiscal deficits and nou-inflationary
mechanisms  for financing  them.  In principle, this can be done through responsible  expenditure  and revenue
policies.  In practice, experience  shows that it  requires institutional  arrangemnents  which restrain profligate28
expenditure.  An open capital account provides one mechanism for such a restraint, as shown by the experience of
Indonesia.  Indonesia therefore is forced to follow a balanced budget policy to avoid potential balance of payments
problems.  The other is to separate effectively monetary and fiscal policy, either by joining  a monetary union a la
the CFA Zone, or by establishing and managing an independent Central Bank.  This independence also needs an
institutional structure akin to the  Federal Reserve System in the United States.  The Central  Bank needs to be
allocated the status of the judicial systems and its independence fiercely protected.
The costs of joining  a monetary union appear to be high.  These arise largely from the fact the nominal
exchange rate gets pegged, restricting adjustment in the real rate.  During adjustment, the burden is bome entirely
L,  expenditure cuts rather than by expenditure switching.  On the other hand, benefits are price-stability.  The best
option is to have the control on the  fiscal/monetary policy without the rigidity  of a fixed pegged exchange rate.
This is the option countries such as Indonesia have followed through the open capital account.  It appears to provide
the path to price stability without jeopardizing growth.29
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